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This report contains interim findings from research 
into the policing of the Barton Moss Community 
Protection Camp at Barton Moss, Salford, Greater 
Manchester, conducted by researchers from Liverpool 
John Moores University and the University of York. 
The camp was in place from November 2013 until 
April 2014 for the duration of the exploratory drilling 
operation conducted by energy company IGas Energy 
at Barton Moss. Camp residents and supporters en-
gaged in a campaign of protest and direct action to 
raise awareness about the apparent dangers of hydrau-
lic fracturing – better known as fracking – at Barton 
Moss. Greater Manchester Police (GMP) conducted a 
policing operation – codenamed Operation Gerald-
ton – at Barton Moss over the course of the drilling 
operation conducted by IGas.
The report draws upon interviews conducted by the 
authors with camp residents and those taking part 
in direct action. It also collates, and draws upon, so-
cial media and other media reporting on the Barton 
Moss camp, as well as other publicly available infor-
mation such as public statements, press releases, and 
responses to requests for information made by the au-
thors under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to 
relevant public bodies, including Greater Manchester 
Police. The report documents concerns about the na-
ture, function and proportionality of the policing op-
eration at the camp and the way that policing methods 
were deployed in accordance with the obligations to 
facilitate peaceful protest underpinned by the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.1
 
This report raises serious questions about the propor-
tionality of arrest patterns and bail conditions, as well 
as the dominant media and public portrayal of the 
protest and the protesters, including the role played 
by GMP in influencing this portrayal. The report 
documents protesters’ experiences of violence and 
harassment by the police including gendered violence 
experienced by women involved at the camp. Particu-
lar attention is drawn to the role of Tactical Aid Unit 
officers in the policing of protest marches, and the role 
of senior officers in the communication and public in-
formation strategies conducted as part of Operation 
Geraldton. 
Ultimately, the report highlights the various proce-
dures adopted by GMP in the management of the pro-
test that had the effect of curtailing the right to protest, 
and seeks to substantiate unacknowledged claims that 
the policing operation was violent, disproportionate 
to the size and peaceful nature of the protest, and car-
ried out with impunity. This research raises important 
questions about the nature of democratic accountabil-
ity and public order policing in England and Wales. 
eXecutive suMMaRy
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01. the protest at Barton Moss was overwhelmingly 
peaceful. 
The emphasis throughout the protest was for the 
actions to be disruptive, and for the camp to raise 
awareness about fracking, whilst remaining peaceful 
and non-violent. 
02. the nature and scale of the policing operation 
had the effect of undermining the right of 
protesters to protest peacefully at Barton Moss.
Due to the approach taken, Greater Manchester Police 
failed in their obligation to facilitate peaceful protest.
03. the police and crime commissioner’s panel 
Report on the Barton Moss environmental protest 
largely excluded the voices of the protesters
and was not only unrepresentative of the experiences 
of protesters involved at Barton Moss, but represented 
one perspective of a complex series of events.
04. the communication strategy implemented 
by greater Manchester police during operation 
geraldton was focussed primarily on justifying the 
policing operation
and questioning the legitimacy of the protest, rather 
than being focussed on providing the public with clear 
information about the protest and policing operation. 
05. effective dialogue between police and 
protesters was not established, and this was a 
result of an apparent mutual lack of trust.
The conduct of GMP, from the planning stages of 
Operation Geraldton to its conclusion, suggested a 
lack of trust of protesters, and a refusal to consider 
protesters as one of the parties who shared mutual 
interests in the successful management of the protest. 
From the protesters’ perspective, Protest Liaison 
Officers were perceived by many at Barton Moss to 
have been involved in collecting intelligence on the 
protest to feed back to other officers, and thus not to 
be trusted in the development of dialogue, and the 
development of relationships, between police and 
protesters.   
06. violent behaviour and harassment were central 
features of the policing operation.
All protesters consulted for this research had direct 
experience of police violence exercised in the policing 
of daily slow marches. 
07. several women who were involved at Barton 
Moss reported sexualised violence by gMp officers.
This violence had a direct effect on how camp residents 
and supporters engaged with the protest at Barton 
Moss, and was in direct contravention of human 
rights protections including the right to be free from 
degrading treatment and discrimination. 
08. Despite gMp’s insistence that they sought to 
key finDings
The Report generated several key findings, including:
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balance the rights of protesters with the rights of 
those wanting to carry out drilling on the site,
the behaviour of GMP officers throughout Operation 
Geraldton – from its planning stages to its conclusion 
– had the effect of prioritising commercial interests 
over the right of local residents and supporters to 
exercise their right to protest. 
09. the overwhelming majority (98%) of arrests 
were for non-violent offences.
These figures cast doubt on the legitimacy of GMP’s 
characterisation of the protest as ‘extremely violent’.
10. in contrast to the official police portrayal of 
the protest as consisting of outside ‘agitators’, the 
Barton Moss protest was overwhelmingly local in 
its composition;
it was sustained largely through donations and support 
from local people, and the largest category of arrests 
at Barton Moss were of people who resided within the 
direct vicinity of the fracking site.
11. two thirds (66%) of arrested protesters whose 
cases have concluded have had their cases dropped, 
dismissed or been found not guilty by the courts.
The conviction rate is significantly lower than that 
occurring within the criminal justice system as a 
whole.
12. police bail powers were routinely abused in 
order to restrict the right to protest.
The imposition of blanket bail conditions served as a 
form of summary punishment which enabled police 
officers to control the movement of protesters without 
recourse to the formal criminal justice system. 
13. given the low conviction rates, arrests at Barton 
Moss did not appear to have been carried out with a 
view to securing convictions.
Rather, mass arrest and blanket bail in effect served 
to create a protest exclusion zone around the fracking 
site – an action that would otherwise have no basis in 
law and would be a clear violation of the protesters’ 
rights under the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
14. the cumulative impact of these processes was 
the routine abuse of police powers at the expense of 
protesters’ civil liberties.
15. a collective response from protesters,
including the use of legal observers, police monitoring 
groups and defence campaigns, played a vital role in 
holding police officers to account and preventing 
further miscarriages of justice.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Read our six key 
recommendations on Page 45.
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intRoDuction
This report contains interim findings from research 
into the policing of the Barton Moss Community 
Protection Camp at Barton Moss, Salford, Greater 
Manchester, conducted by researchers from Liverpool 
John Moores University and the University of York. 
The camp was in place from November 2013 until 
April 2014 for the duration of the exploratory drilling 
operation conducted by energy company IGas Energy 
at Barton Moss. Camp residents and supporters en-
gaged in a campaign of protest and direct action to 
raise awareness about the apparent dangers of hydrau-
lic fracturing – better known as fracking – at Barton 
Moss. Greater Manchester Police (GMP) conducted a 
policing operation – codenamed Operation Gerald-
ton – at Barton Moss over the course of the drilling 
operation conducted by IGas.
1.1 MethoDology
The authors of this report made a series of visits to the 
Barton Moss Community Protection Camp to engage 
in fieldwork and undertook semi-structured inter-
views with camp residents and those taking part in 
direct action2.  This report documents concerns about 
the nature, function and proportionality of the polic-
ing operation at the camp and the way that policing 
methods were deployed in accordance with the obli-
gations to facilitate peaceful protest underpinned by 
the European Convention on Human Rights3.  It also 
raises concerns about the legality or otherwise of ar-
rest patterns and bail conditions, as well as the domi-
nant media and public portrayal of the protest and the 
protesters, including the role played by GMP in influ-
encing this portrayal. 
Our analysis is situated within a contextual frame-
work which argues that the experiences of those at the 
camp – those who were being policed at Barton Moss 
– are central to unlocking what happened during the 
protest. This approach enables us to use the perspec-
tives of those who were there to reinterpret the effects 
of the policing operation and its ability to shape wider 
perceptions of public order policing and acts of dis-
sent. As such, this report provides a view from below, 
drawing on testimonies provided by camp residents 
and those involved in direct action. The content is 
therefore offered as a counter-narrative to, or can be 
contrasted with, the findings presented in the Police 
and Crime Commissioner’s Independent Panel Re-
port on the Policing of Protests and Demonstrations 
published in October 20144.  The voices of those with 
whom we spoke with, through interviews and during 
our interactions at the camp, are largely absent from 
the Police and Crime Commissioner’s Panel Report 
on The Barton Moss Environmental Protest, and the 
conclusions drawn in that report do not represent the 
views expressed by those who contributed to this re-
search. 
This report centralises the role that experience should 
play in knowledge formation and seeks to redress 
the imbalance of power relations by giving a voice to 
individuals who have often been ignored by official 
discourses and academic writing, including the afore-
mentioned Police and Crime Commissioner’s Panel 
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Report as well as dominant media outlets reporting 
on Barton Moss. Consequently, it provides a powerful 
challenge to the narrative set by GMP and the conclu-
sions drawn by the Police and Crime Commissioner’s 
Panel Report. It also facilitates a ‘culture of learning’ – 
where we learn from, and with, those engaged in pro-
test about how best to adopt a human rights approach 
to exercising the rights to freedom of peaceful assem-
bly – as recommended by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of 
Association, in his report on the UK in 20135. 
The report also collates and draws upon social media 
and other media reporting on the Barton Moss camp 
as well as other publicly available information such as 
public statements, press releases and Freedom of In-
formation Act responses from relevant public bodies 
including Greater Manchester Police. These discours-
es are used to contest the validity and legitimacy of 
many of the claims made in Greater Manchester Po-
lice’s statements and in the Police and Crime Com-
missioner’s Panel Report – for example, that the 
protesters and camp residents were violent agitators 
engaged in illegal activity – and to question the broad-
er motivations of the policing operation. The report 
highlights the various procedures adopted that had 
the effect of curtailing the right to protest, and seeks 
to substantiate unacknowledged claims that the polic-
ing operation was violent, incongruous to the size and 
peaceful nature of the protest, and carried out with 
impunity. In doing so, it raises serious questions about 
the nature of democratic accountability and policing 
in England and Wales. 
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2.1. fRacking in the uk
“Fracking”, or hydraulic fracturing, is the process of 
extracting shale gas from solid rock hundreds of me-
tres to kilometres below the surface, by pumping wa-
ter, sand and chemicals at high pressure into the rock. 
Technological advances in the last twenty-five years, 
driven by the merger of hydraulic fracturing and hori-
zontal drilling techniques, have enabled the exploita-
tion of previously inaccessible shale gas reserves. In 
the last decade these technological advances, devel-
oped predominantly in the US, have been exported 
around the globe. Energy companies have turned 
their attention to Europe, and the deposits of shale gas 
that have been identified across the continent6.  In the 
UK, significant shale deposits have been identified7, 
and exploratory drilling to explore their potential has 
been actively encouraged by UK governments since 
20078.  
However, while a number of governments across Eu-
rope, including the New Labour, Coalition and cur-
rent Conservative governments in the UK, have em-
braced fracking, the development of new techniques 
for drilling have been controversial from the outset. 
Communities and environmental groups have raised 
concerns about the immediate impact on local envi-
ronments, including land, air and water pollution9, 
as well as the broader issue of maintaining a reliance 
on carbon intensive fossil fuels in the face of global 
climate change10.  Despite the enthusiasm of some 
European governments, others, under pressure from 
community organisations and environmental groups, 
have suspended or banned the procedure. Recent 
votes by the Scottish11 and Welsh12  governments have 
seen them adopt similar positions to those taken by 
France13,  Bulgaria14,  and Germany15,  recommending 
a moratorium on fracking, leaving them out of step 
with UK government policy. 
In June 2015, Lancashire County Council’s Develop-
ment Control Committee voted to refuse applications 
by oil and gas company Cuadrilla to explore for shale 
gas at two sites in Lancashire16.  However, in Novem-
ber of 2015 the Department for Communities and 
Local Government announced that the final decision 
on UK fracking applications will now be made by the 
Secretary of State, due to ‘the national importance of 
the schemes’.17  
The first major protests in the UK against fracking 
came in the summer of 2013 at Balcombe, Sussex, 
where a coalition of local groups and environmental 
campaigners from around the country established a 
protest camp at the exploratory drilling site run by en-
ergy company Cuadrilla. The camp residents and visi-
tors engaged in direct action to disrupt the operation 
and raise awareness about fracking in the UK. Despite 
declining public support18,  fracking is now a central 
component of UK government strategy on ‘energy se-
curity’ and central to current UK energy policy. The 
process of moving from exploratory drilling to gas 
extraction was encouraged by the launch of new on-
shore oil and gas licences in July 2014, and again in 
December 2015, and also by changes to trespass laws 
introduced in the Infrastructure Act 2015 that remove 
the right of land owners to object to drilling under 
their property when at a depth of more than 300 me-
tres19.  
2.2 BaRton Moss coMMunity pRotection caMp
On the 17th June 2010, Salford Council voted to allow 
coal mining on the Green Belt land at Barton Moss, 
Salford, despite local objections and concerns. With 
news that energy company IGas Energy would begin 
exploratory drilling to explore for coal bed methane 
at Barton Moss in mid-November 2013, concerned 
residents from the local area, and some from further 
the BackgRounD to the BaRton Moss pRotest
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afield, began to set up camp at the site. This camp was 
influenced by the successful protest camp at Balcombe, 
West Sussex, in the summer of 2013. On Wednesday 
27th November 2013, with the Barton Moss camp 
part established, the first direct anti-fracking protest 
took place in the form of a community blockade that 
sought to prevent lorries entering the site. Over the 
period of protest, between November 2013 and April 
2014, the camp gathered momentum and established 
itself as a community-led protection camp, sustained 
by local support and donations. Those involved 
adopted several protest techniques, including the use 
of ‘lock-ons’20  and blockades, but relied most heavily 
on slow walking in front of IGas convoys in order to 
delay the drilling operation and to provide a visible 
and constant opposition to fracking in Salford. These 
slow walk protests took place twice daily, as the IGas 
lorries arrived and left the site, for four days per week, 
for the duration of the drilling operation. The camp 
remained in situ until 18th April 2014. When the 
camp disbanded, the site was cleared and returned to 
its former state. Seeds were scattered and trees planted 
to compensate for any damage caused by the protest-
ers between November 2013 and April 2014.
2.3 the Right to pRotest
The right to protest is a fundamental liberty within a 
liberal democracy, providing an arena within which 
dissent and opposition may be expressed outside of the 
formal political structures. Such actions have histori-
cally resulted in important social reforms, including 
the right to vote, women’s rights and the right to form, 
and to belong to, a trade union. Since October 2000, 
when the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in 
the UK, the right for citizens to engage in public pro-
test has been formally recognised in law. As a public 
body, Greater Manchester Police have a positive obli-
gation under the Act to actively uphold and facilitate 
the rights and freedoms enshrined in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)21.  These in-
clude the right to liberty and security (Article 5), the 
right to respect for private and family life (Article 8), 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 
9), freedom of expression (Article 10) and freedom of 
assembly and association (Article 11). 
Although restrictions on some of these rights may 
be permitted in limited circumstances, such as in the 
interests of “public safety”, “the prevention of dis-
order or crime”, and the protection of the “rights of 
others”22,  the European Court of Human Rights has 
made it clear that the balance should always fall in fa-
vour of those seeking to assert their right to protest, 
unless there is strong evidence for interfering with 
these rights23.  Any restrictions on rights must also be 
proportionate, meaning that the measures taken are 
the least restrictive necessary to achieve the legitimate 
aim24.  
A report published by the House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee in the aftermath of the G20 pro-
tests in the City of London in 2009, emphasised that 
this positive duty on the part of the state to facilitate 
peaceful protest should be an overarching considera-
tion in any public order policing operation:
‘Above all, the police must constantly remember 
that those who protest on Britain’s streets are not 
criminals but citizens motivated by moral prin-
ciples, exercising their democratic rights. The po-
lice’s doctrine must remain focussed on allowing 
this protest to happen peacefully’25.  
In a similar vein, the United Nations Special Rappor-
teur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly has 
stressed:
‘…the utmost importance of the rights to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and of association in a democratic 
society. This is all the more important as the United 
Kingdom, like much of the world, is going through 
some tough economic challenges that will undoubt-
edly cause dislocation and discontent. It is in such dif-
ficult times, with angry and frustrated citizens, that 
the respect for such rights must be at its highest’26. 
2.4 opeRation geRalDton
The policing operation at Barton Moss, conducted by 
GMP, was codenamed Operation Geraldton. The sen-
ior officer with overall responsibility for the policing 
operation was Chief Superintendent Mark Roberts27. 
Operation Geraldton was planned prior to the start 
of drilling by IGas, and the subsequent protests, at the 
end of November 2013. In light of the protests at Bal-
combe in the summer of 2013, GMP had anticipated 
that there would be protests at Barton Moss as this 
site was identified as the next location in the UK for 
exploratory drilling to assess coal beds and potential 
shale formations. The planning for Operation Ger-
aldton involved the production of a Memorandum 
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of Understanding (MOU) signed by GMP, and other 
related parties, in advance of IGas beginning the drill-
ing operation28.  
Alongside GMP, the parties who were signatories to 
this MOU included Greater Manchester Fire and Res-
cue, the North West Ambulance Service, Salford City 
Council, the Association of Greater Manchester Au-
thorities, the Highways Agency, and Manchester Bar-
ton Aerodrome (due to the proximity of Barton Moss 
to the Aerodrome). In addition, the landowners Peel 
Holdings/Estates and IGas were included in this ‘ex-
pression of common interest’. Formally, the purpose 
of the MOU was to ‘articulate the basis and general 
principles for ongoing cooperation, and coordination 
between the Parties in order to promote and contrib-
ute to the realisation of their mutual interests in rela-
tion to the delivery of the Gold Strategy’29.  
Operation Geraldton was developed with the input 
of these strategic partners, but, based on the research 
conducted for this report, it appears that no mem-
bers of local, or national campaign groups, were ap-
proached to be involved in the development of the 
MOU or the planning of Operation Geraldton.
 
The policing operation lasted for over 20 weeks and 
during this time there were 231 arrests30.  The costs 
of Operation Geraldton reached £1.7 million by the 
end of 201430  and these costs were met by GMP alone 
as an application to national government for help in 
covering the costs, made by Tony Lloyd, Police and 
Crime Commissioner for Greater Manchester, was re-
fused by the Home Office in 201432. 
GMP received 77 complaints between 27th Novem-
ber 2013 and 11th March 2014 relating to Operation 
Geraldton33.  These complaints related to a range of 
issues concerning GMP’s handling of the protest; re-
cords released under the Freedom of Information Act 
demonstrate that 40% of the complaints related to the 
misuse of force by GMP officers34.  
Operation Geraldton was a major policing operation 
that lasted for more than six months. It was planned 
in collaboration with IGas and the Local Authority 
well in advance of the protest. The scale and intensity 
of the policing operation led Barbara Keeley, MP for 
Worsley and Eccles South, to raise concerns that the 
number of police officers deployed was out of propor-
tion to the size of the protest, adding that officers ap-
peared to be ‘spending time at the Barton Moss pro-
test rather than patrolling in our local communities’35. 
In response, GMP released a statement which stated 
that the policing response had been ‘proportionate’36.  
2.5 police anD cRiMe coMMissioneR’s 
inDepenDent panel RepoRt
In response to the volume and nature of complaints 
about Operation Geraldton, in March 2014 Tony 
Lloyd, the Police and Crime Commissioner for Great-
er Manchester, established an Independent Panel on 
the Policing of Protests and Demonstrations. The 
panel was chaired by Martin Miller, Chief Executive 
of the Diocese of Manchester, and was composed of 
seven additional members, who were, in the words 
of the PCC, ‘drawn from across Greater Manchester’s 
diverse communities’ and brought with them ‘a vast 
range of experience including protest and trade union 
activism, politics, policing, community relations, me-
dia and youth engagement’37.  The first investigation 
by this panel, focussed on The Barton Moss Environ-
mental Protest, was published in October 201438.  For 
Tony Lloyd the nature of the protest, and the concerns 
raised about the policing at Barton Moss, meant that 
‘independent scrutiny of this operation was needed in 
order to build trust and public confidence in our po-
lice service’.39  
The report sought to examine the ‘unique issues’ that 
the Barton Moss protest created for GMP in ‘a frank, 
honest and balanced way to see what learning can be 
applied to future contentious protests’40. In addition, 
the report aimed to ‘provide constructive feedback to 
police and others around the management of conten-
tious and complex protests’41. 
The report explains that members of the panel con-
ducted visits to Barton Moss and observed the opera-
tion from the police control room. The document also 
explains that members of the panel spoke to Greater 
Manchester Police (officers and staff involved direct-
ly and indirectly in the operation and the associated 
communications), and protesters both during visits 
to Barton Moss and in interviews conducted off site42. 
They also spoke with local businesses and residents 
around Barton Moss Road, along with representatives 
from Salford Council, IGas and the media. 
The Panel made a number of observations about the 
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protest at Barton Moss, and about Operation Gerald-
ton. They concluded that ‘GMP was committed to bal-
ancing, as best it could, the competing rights of the 
protesters, local businesses and local residents’43,  and, 
that while most of the action taken by protesters at 
Barton Moss was peaceful, some tactics used by some 
members of the camp ‘crossed the line’ of what is ac-
ceptable44. 
Most notably, they made clear that ‘throughout the 
evidence-gathering process of this report, no panel 
members witnessed any behaviour by police that 
could objectively be described as “brutality”’45.  Fur-
thermore, the panel noted that:
“Significantly, none of those we spoke to witnessed 
behaviour by police that could be categorised as 
violent. No protester we spoke to witnessed police 
violence, no panel member witnessed police violence, 
nor did anyone else we spoke to including impartial 
media representatives who were present at Barton 
Moss.”46
Ultimately, the panel concluded that ‘many of the is-
sues arising from the protest at Barton Moss could 
have been mitigated, or even resolved, by better pre-
planning and more constructive communications and 
engagement during the operation’47. 
The panel made nine recommendations48.  Five of the 
nine recommendations were for GMP, three were for 
relevant agencies and public bodies, and one was for 
protesters and protest organisers. The recommenda-
tions for GMP were as follows: To do more to engage 
with protest groups; to explore other alternatives to 
reach agreement in the event of a breakdown in trust 
between protesters and police; to consider inviting a 
nominated representative agreed by police and pro-
testers into the police control room, on the same ad-
visory status as other third party bodies; to do more 
to recognise the diverse nature of those who take part 
in protests; and finally, to provide supporting infor-
mation when the police publicise a controversial in-
cident.  
The single recommendation for protesters was for 
Protesters to ‘do more to recognise their responsibili-
ties during protests’ which was based on the conclu-
sion that, at Barton Moss, ‘there were isolated inci-
dents that were unacceptable’.
The report was welcomed by GMP and all recommen-
dations were accepted by the force49.  The report was, 
however, criticised by campaign groups and many of 
those involved at Barton Moss for having serious fail-
ings. Much of this criticism focussed on the method-
ology of the report; no public appeal for witnesses was 
made, and the majority of those involved at Barton 
Moss were thus excluded from an investigation that 
was perceived to have been conducted behind closed 
doors50.  The independence of the report was also 
questioned on the grounds that it was submitted to 
GMP before publication for ‘final input’51.  Finally, it 
was criticised for failing to examine in depth key as-
pects of the policing operation52. 
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“significantly, none of those we spoke 
to witnessed behaviour by police 
that could be categorised as violent. 
no protester we spoke to witnessed 
police violence, no panel member 
witnessed police violence, nor did 
anyone else we spoke to including 
impartial media representatives who 
were present at Barton Moss.”
Police and Crime Commisioner
Independent Panel Report - Page 12
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3.1 estaBlishing the caMp
 
The Barton Moss Community Protection Camp was 
established in mid-November 2013 and members 
of the camp stayed in situ until mid-April 2014. The 
Camp was set up, and remained, a non-hierarchical 
unit with no formal leader or centre. It was built 
around a group of individuals with shared concerns 
who were free to act autonomously53.  A significant 
number of local residents joined the twice-daily pro-
tests and shared the ethos and aims of the camp. Oth-
er local residents sustained the camp with essential 
goods and food donations and the provision of wash-
ing facilities54 as outlined below:
‘We’ve a good group of locals who 
do come down here every day and 
walk the lorries, filling up water and 
bringing it back, giving us cooked 
meals, letting us go and have a bath, 
getting clean clothes…just when they 
come and say thank you for what we 
are doing, it boosts our morale. it 
shows that we are wanted here; we are 
needed here’ - protester
The Camp was established on the side of a public foot-
path on a private road, Barton Moss Road. Tents, com-
munal areas and other facilities lined part of the road 
that IGas trucks had to travel along, from the main 
access point on the A57, along Barton Moss Road, to 
the entrance of the IGas site. 
Many of the camp’s residents and supporters referred 
to themselves as ‘protectors’55  to emphasize that the 
focus of their opposition to fracking lay, in the first 
instance, with protecting the environment. Camp 
residents and supporters adopted several protest tech-
niques, including the use of lock-ons and blockades, 
but relied most heavily on slow walking, or marching, 
in front of IGas convoys in order to disrupt and delay 
the drilling operation and to provide visible and con-
stant opposition to fracking. In addition to the slow 
marches, members of the Camp and local support-
ers held rallies at the site, including tea parties, music 
events and family days. They, along with around 1,000 
other people, attended an Anti-Fracking demonstra-
tion in Central Manchester on 9th March 201456,  and 
many members of the Camp participated in discus-
sions at local meetings to highlight how best to mobi-
lise local opposition to fracking. 
The aims of the Barton Moss Community Protection 
Camp can be broadly summarised as follows:
• To demonstrate opposition to the drilling by IGas 
Energy at the Barton Moss site, Salford, Manchester. 
• To delay the drilling operation by methods of peace-
ful protest through having a permanent presence at 
the site
the BaRton Moss coMMunity pRotection caMp
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• To protect the land at Barton Moss and to preserve 
the water and air of the local community.
• To raise awareness of the drilling procedure taking 
place at Barton Moss and the dangers of fracking.
• More broadly, the camp aimed to make the above 
interventions to highlight the general hazards associ-
ated with fracking and the impact this could have on 
future generations57. 
3.2 the Role of the caMp: pRotesteRs’ 
peRspectives
For many of the people involved in the protest at Bar-
ton Moss, both as camp residents and supporters, the 
focus of the protest changed as the policing opera-
tion developed. The intensification in policing tactics 
meant that the right to protest became a dual concern 
which underpinned many of the actions and experi-
ences of camp members and supporters:
‘for some people there’s definitely 
been a shift of focus, because 
obviously none of us that came up 
here originally were here against the 
gMp or against that kind of behaviour. 
But then obviously, with their kind of 
behaviour, it’s left no choice for us but 
to also campaign against the police, 
the way they’ve been treating people 
that are up here’ - protester
Those involved spoke about the changing nature of 
their role; as strategies to suppress their protest di-
versified and intensified, so did the nature of their re-
sponses: 
‘My direct action has been a direct response to the 
TAU (Tactical Aid Unit) marching people in in 
under 15 minutes. That is not facilitating peaceful 
protest. That is dismantling the protest. It shows 
us no respect and that is what brings on direct 
action’ 
In March 2014, protesters from the camp established 
a second camp outside GMP headquarters in Newton 
Heath, Manchester, to protest against the ‘brutality 
and violence’ of the policing during the daily demon-
strations58.  As arrests became more frequent and bail 
conditions more restrictive, members of the Camp 
provided support to those detained in police custody, 
and acted as witnesses in court for one another. In 
part this was a pragmatic response, however, the sus-
tained emphasis on police violence and perceived cor-
ruption59,  as well as the provision of court character 
references, was also an attempt to counter the official 
portrayal of the police presence as proportionate and 
the Camp residents and supporters as unreasonable 
people. Maintaining a visible presence in the public 
sphere was linked to the recognition of the struggle 
at Barton Moss, and to effectively challenging GMP’s 
version of events. As such, another key role of some 
of those involved was to film and stream the daily 
marches in order to visually document the protest.
‘it is about protecting the line and 
protecting the air, and protecting 
the water and protecting the future 
for the kids, and people protecting 
themselves. it’s like on two levels: 
protecting the earth and, through 
necessity of how we’re being policed, 
people protecting each other as best 
that they can’.  - protester
The articulation of their role as ‘protectors’, therefore, 
took on several meanings; not only were they protect-
ing the land, and the future prospects of the environ-
ment, they were also defending the right to protest.
 
In referring to themselves as ‘protectors’, some camp 
residents and visitors saw a distinction between pro-
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tecting and protesting in their role at Barton Moss. 
For some, this distinction became clearer as the focus 
on policing developed:
‘As for the slow walk down, that’s what we’ve been 
trying to protect, the land itself, so that isn’t a pro-
test. But then, if there are unlawful arrests that 
day, I’ll go down to the police station and I will 
make a protest. So, personally, for me, it’s both’. 
‘I’m a protector when it comes to the fracking thing, 
but I’m also a protester when it comes to the police 
issue’.
anne power, a member of the Barton 
Moss community protection camp and a 
committed anti-fracking campaigner won 
the observer ethical award 2014 in the 
‘local hero award’ category.
The Barton Moss Community Protection Camp came 
Runner-Up in the same category.
For Anne Power, her role at the camp was pivotal 
in helping to combat the negative representation of 
protesters:
“I stand as witness in court looking like a respectable 
citizen, which helps the judge decide they’re not dealing 
with morons, layabouts and hippies, but clever, dedi-
cated people, giving up their lives to a cause.”60
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4.1 Role of police officeRs 
4.1.1 liaison anD Dialogue
In the public statements made during Operation Ger-
aldton, Chief Constable Peter Fahy and other GMP 
spokespeople sought to make clear that they under-
stood that the right to protest is a basic human right. 
Recent changes in protest policing in the UK, driven 
by a human rights agenda, have revolved around rec-
ommendations for effective communication between 
police and protesters. In 2009, following its inquiry 
into the policing of protest in the UK, the Joint Com-
mittee on Human Rights (JCHR) published its report 
on a human rights approach to policing protest. In its 
report the JCHR recommended that police forces ‘fos-
ter effective dialogue with protesters’61  to enable com-
peting rights claims to be balanced in protest situa-
tions. The idea of ‘dialogue policing’ was developed by 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) 
in its 2009 review, ‘Adapting to protest – nurturing the 
British model of policing’, as it recommended that of-
ficers on the ground ‘should engage with crowd mem-
bers to gather information about their intentions, de-
meanour, concerns and sensibilities’62. 
Since the resulting updates to the ACPO Manual on 
Keeping the Peace in 2010, protest policing has in-
volved the use of Protest Liaison Officers (PLOs) 
whose key function ‘is engagement and communica-
tion in order to assist in the facilitation of peaceful 
protest’63.  GMP prides itself on being a centre of ex-
cellence for the management of public disorder and 
has been at the forefront of the pilot training pro-
gramme for Liaison Officers. During the Barton Moss 
the policing of the pRotest: key finDings
protest GMP was training a number of PLOs and they 
were a regular presence at the camp. GMP explained 
to the PCC Panel that PLOs ‘worked to build relation-
ships with those at the camp’64  and were central to 
the attempts to establish dialogue between police and 
protesters.
However, this dialogue was not effectively established 
at Barton Moss, and for the duration of the camp, of-
ficers and protesters were not able to establish either 
meaningful communication or points of agreement 
about the management of daily marches. For GMP 
this lack of dialogue was a result of the refusal by pro-
testers to engage. GMP explained to the PCC Panel 
that dialogue and negotiation had been attempted by 
officers at Barton Moss but ‘GMP felt some protesters 
acted in a cynical way and had no real desire to nego-
tiate with police’.65 
GMP and the PCC Panel concluded that this refusal to 
communicate effectively was due to an unwillingness 
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to elect an official spokesperson for the camp and a 
more general unwillingness to engage with the police. 
For the PCC Panel, this demonstrated the protesters’ 
failure to uphold their ‘responsibilities’ and suggested 
that:
‘Protesters at similar protests in the future should 
consider developing a set of principles for their 
protest – outlining what they will do, what behav-
iour is acceptable and what behaviour is not. This 
should include ensuring they have definite indi-
viduals with whom the police can liaise effectively 
(even if these change from day to day in line with 
their “collective” principles)’.66
However, this statement fails to consider how the role 
of PLOs was perceived by protesters at Barton Moss, 
and how attempts to establish communication by po-
lice were received at the camp. Despite speaking with 
a representative, the PCC Panel failed to acknowledge 
that one of the key local campaign groups, Frack Free 
Greater Manchester, had tried to play a liaison role 
at Barton Moss but GMP had refused to meet with 
them.67  For the PCC Panel, protesters should shoul-
der responsibility for liaison but the report fails to 
consider why lines of communication were not sus-
tained. 
An additional obstacle to effective liaison between 
protesters and police lay with the perception of the 
role of protest liaison officers by many involved in 
the protest. For many protesters, the PLOs were pre-
dominantly concerned with gathering intelligence as 
opposed to establishing meaningful dialogue and ne-
gotiation:
‘They are a bit of a misnomer to me; a bit of a non-
starter. They have pre-set limits as to where they 
can let their perceptions go. They have to keep up 
the company line – ‘we’re facilitating a peaceful 
protest’ – even when evidently they aren’t’.
For many, the PLOs were part of the policing opera-
tion and in a number of cases they appeared to iden-
tify protesters for other officers to arrest. Negotiation 
appeared to be set as a precondition for acceptable 
protest; in this sense it appeared that ‘peaceful’ protest 
was only that which is negotiated with, and sanctioned 
by, police. For many protesters this was an unaccepta-
ble constraint placed on their disruptive, yet peaceful, 
action. The clear lack of trust between protesters and 
police prevented effective dialogue and this appeared 
only to become worse as the police operation became 
notably more physical, and the number of arrests in-
creased, as the protest developed in 2014. 
For many protesters the different type of police offic-
ers who were involved at Barton Moss worked to the 
same ends and were essentially indistinguishable in 
terms of their overall function. Officers with appar-
ently different functions at Barton Moss appeared to 
work together to arrest those involved in the daily 
marches as evidenced by one protester’s experience 
described below:
‘I was marked for it [arrest] this morning. It was very, 
very obvious that there was a collusion between the 
police on the line, the TAU (Tactical Aid Unit) again 
funnily enough, and the liaison officers that I was go-
ing to be snatched…err...and suddenly from nowhere, 
walking at a steady pace, not doing any obstruction, 
suddenly it became ‘don’t push back on me’, and that 
seemed to co-ordinate with exactly the same time 
when this TAU guy decided to push hard against me 
with his fist and his chest…and as soon as he barged 
me again, at the immediate same time, he said ‘if you 
push back on me again you’re gonna be arrested’, and 
at the exact same time a liaison officer, who wasn’t 
close enough to be hearing that, came through the 
crowd with his earpiece and went ‘we are gonna have 
to tell you now that if you push back again you’re go-
ing to be arrested’. And it was very, very obvious that 
I had been marked for it’ 
PLOs were not trusted by many protesters because in-
formation gathered by these officers appeared to be 
fed directly back to the arresting officers. As the in-
terview above suggests, protesters often felt they had 
been singled out for police attention and this again 
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negatively impacted on the levels of trust between 
protesters and police.
 
4.1.2 the tactical aiD unit
The focal point for many of the complaints by protest-
ers was the Tactical Aid Unit (TAU) which was per-
ceived to have a very specific function at Barton Moss. 
In an open letter dated 18th July 2014, the Greater 
Manchester Association of Trades Councils raised 
concerns with the Police and Crime Commission-
er Tony Lloyd specifically about the TAU. The letter 
made clear that the concern lay not with the behav-
iour of individual officers but with ‘the leadership of 
and the operation of the Tactical Aid Unit as a whole 
service’68. 
For many of the protesters at Barton Moss, the TAU 
officers appeared to have a very specific function and 
were used with increasing frequency as the protest de-
veloped. Additionally, for many of those interviewed 
for this report, the TAU were responsible for the ma-
jority of the very physical, and at times violent polic-
ing and appeared to be used strategically in the po-
licing operation to prevent the daily protest marches 
from being effective:
‘I think the routine had been followed – it happens 
quite often – we’d had the normal constables for the 
first ten minutes. Somebody behind the lines on the 
police side deemed it wasn’t going quick enough, so 
the normal constables were withdrawn, the TAU 
would take their place. And we all knew then, okay, 
the aggression is going to go up, they’re going to push 
harder, faster’.
For many the experience of policing at Barton Moss 
was reason enough to refuse to engage with the police. 
For those protesters who had attended other protests 
prior to Barton Moss, especially those at Balcombe, 
their previous experience was itself sufficient to pre-
vent them engaging with officers. Recent documents 
released following Operation Mansell at Balcombe 
suggest that the protesters’ perception of PLOs as intel-
ligence gatherers was in that instance well founded69. 
This experience at Balcombe undoubtedly informed 
the way in which the protest camp developed at Bar-
ton Moss and the way in which many residents and 
visitors interacted with the police. It is therefore un-
surprising that many protesters refused to enter into 
dialogue with police. It is also unsurprising that many 
were sceptical about engaging with the PCC Panel Re-
port given the perceived lack of independence Tony 
Lloyd had from GMP in the eyes of many involved in 
the protest at Barton Moss:
‘They (PCC Panel) turned up, I think it was either 
Thursday or Friday last week, and there was about, I 
think I saw about six of them. I didn’t know who they 
were at first; no one mentioned that they were coming 
to us. We didn’t have any idea; we were just, kind of, 
looking, “Who’s that?” And then we asked one of the 
PLOs and they told us and, yes, they just stood behind 
the police lines the whole time. We didn’t get to speak 
to any of them; they didn’t come to ask us any ques-
tions afterwards. So I think really it’s just PR exercise’.
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4.2 coMMunication anD puBlic infoRMation
The policing operation was represented in very dif-
ferent ways in competing narratives provided by both 
the police and the protesters. GMP issued public state-
ments, including those authored by the Chief Consta-
ble, published news items the GMP website, and pro-
vided commentaries through the Chief Constable’s 
own blog. These updates had a significant effect on the 
media reporting of the protest at Barton Moss.
Regular updates on the cost of the policing and state-
ments on the number of complaints appear to have 
been aimed at shaping public perceptions. The cost of 
the policing operation was regularly updated through 
public statements and repeated in media reports. This 
was done in such a way to suggest the police opera-
tion was a drain on police resources, inferring that it 
was the protesters’ actions that necessitated the police 
presence. As Chief Constable Peter Fahy explained:
‘The cost of this operation is met from our normal 
budget and means that officers on duty at this protest 
are not patrolling their beats or carrying out opera-
tions to investigate crime. We have to be there to en-
sure the protest is peaceful and to balance the rights of 
the protesters and those wanting to carry out drilling 
on the site which are both lawful activities. The police 
are stuck in the middle.’ 70
GMP made repeated statements that detailed the low 
number of complaints received at Barton Moss. This 
was presented as being illustrative of the nature of the 
policing operation: 
‘For all the hundreds of hours of policing we have re-
ceived only 21 complaints, five of which are from the 
same person.’ 71
However, while the number was presented in such a 
way to suggest limited problems with the policing of 
the protest, the figures quoted appear not to match 
up with GMP’s own records released after the conclu-
sion of the policing operation. The statement above, 
from 7th February 2014, stressed the low number of 
complaints at 21, but is contradicted by GMP’s own 
figures for this date72. GMP’s figures demonstrate that 
at this point the number of complaints recorded was 
over twice the number publicly declared by the Chief 
Constable; by 4th February 2014, they had reached a 
total of 50. The emphasis on the low number of com-
plaints in public statements appeared to be driven by 
an attempt to dispel public concerns about the polic-
ing at Barton Moss, and it is unclear why there was 
such a marked difference between GMP’s records and 
the number quoted by the Chief Constable in his pub-
lic statements. 
The apparent error in reporting the number of com-
plaints may possibly relate in part to problems in the 
method of recording, or in the communication of 
these records. Two different records of the number 
of complaints at Barton Moss have been released by 
GMP putting the total number at 57 and 7772.  In the 
document that puts the total figure at 57, a distinc-
tion is drawn between the numbers of ‘complaints’ 
and ‘allegations’, with the number of allegations at 108, 
suggesting that the final figure for complaints, as pub-
lished by GMP, does not reflect the number of times 
those involved at Barton Moss raised an issue with 
the policing operation. In addition, many of the camp 
residents and supporters consulted in the research for 
this report raised concerns about the effectiveness of 
the existing system for police complaints, with some 
suggesting that due to the apparent failings with this 
system, they had simply stopped making complaints:
‘To me, personally, I don’t see the point in complain-
ing any more. To me it just feels like a waste of time, 
that I’m wasting my effort and time ringing the po-
lice and dealing with it, because nothing ever has ever 
changed or been done’ 
This response would appear to reflect a broader ero-
sion of the public’s trust and confidence in the police 
complaints system. Figures collected by the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales show that only 10 per 
cent of those who recall being ‘really annoyed’ with 
the actions of a police officer in the last five years went 
on to make a complaint73. The main reason for not 
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complaining was that there was seen to be no benefit 
or point in doing so. Indeed, the IPCC has in recent 
years reported a significant reduction in the number 
of people making complaints against the police74. The 
apparently low number of complaints arising from the 
Barton Moss protest is not, therefore, necessarily il-
lustrative of a lack of public concern with the behav-
iour of GMP officers.
4.3 the RepResentation of the pRotest anD the 
pRotesteRs
‘Flaregate’
On January 6th, 2014, GMP raided the Barton 
Moss camp and searched it under Section 43 of 
the Terrorism Act 2000. The raid was immedi-
ately press-released by GMP, who claimed they 
acted in response to a flare fired from the camp 
at a police helicopter on the evening of 4th Janu-
ary. No evidence relating to the alleged incident 
was found in the search and the event became 
known among protesters as ‘Flaregate’.
The PCC Panel report noted the significance 
of this event in the deterioration of relations 
between police and protesters. The PCC Panel 
report suggested that GMP should have provid-
ed more evidence to the public to reinforce the 
press statements. For many protesters, the main 
aim of the press statements appeared to be to 
generate negative publicity about the protest.
In the press statement on January 6th, following the 
‘Flaregate’ incident, Chief Superintendent Roberts 
suggested that responsibility lay with the protesters 
despite the lack of evidence found in the search of the 
camp: 
‘If one of the protesters is responsible, I suspect their 
identity will be known to others and I would expect 
those reasonable members of the anti-fracking cam-
paign to provide any information they have to the 
police.’75
In response to the search, GMP statements sought to 
distance protesters from the local community, por-
traying many of those involved as ‘regular’ protesters, 
unreasonable in both their demands and their behav-
iour:
‘Whilst I recognise the genuine concerns of many of 
the protesters in relation to exploratory drilling, it is 
obvious that there is also an element of regular pro-
testers from outside the Greater Manchester area who 
seem more interested in seeking confrontation with 
the police.’76
This division reinforced the idea, suggested in earlier 
media reports on Barton Moss77,  that camp residents 
and visitors were ‘professional protesters’ who did not 
reflect the views of the local community. The idea that 
some of those involved were experienced protesters 
was highlighted in police statements that inferred a 
lack of real affinity with the local anti-fracking cam-
paign. Chief Superintendent Roberts sought in later 
statements to draw a direct distinction between the 
protesters and local residents and in doing so again 
located concerns with the policing of the protest out-
side of the local community, as evidenced below:
“It now seems that the majority of people who are ar-
riving at the site are not there to protest against frack-
ing but are there to disrupt and intimidate the local 
community and to antagonise police” 78
The idea of a fundamental distinction, or even oppo-
sition, between the Camp and ‘the local community’ 
was brought into question by the fact that the Camp 
was sustained by donations and support from mem-
bers of the local community throughout its 20 week 
operation79.  Generalisations about who ‘the local 
community’ were, and whether they were in support 
of, or opposed to, the protest, were central to com-
peting narratives provided by protesters and GMP. It 
was clear that many members of the local commu-
nity supported the camp by the fact that they joined 
the protests at Barton Moss and provided donations, 
as well as joining the much bigger demonstration in 
Manchester on 9th March 201480.  
It was also evident that in some places local residents 
raised issues with the protest and the apparent disrup-
tion caused to the local community, and that this was 
highlighted by GMP. On 10th March  2014 Chief Su-
perintendent Roberts gave a presentation to the In-
dependent Advisory Panel on the Policing of Protests 
that was obtained by the authors under the Freedom 
of Information Act81.  This ‘Barton Moss Briefing’ 
contained quotes from local residents, apparently col-
lected by GMP, that detailed concern with, and even 
opposition to, the Barton Moss protest as reproduced 
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in Figure 1.
The presentation gives no detail on the methods used 
to collect these quotes, and the section titled ‘Resi-
dents (sic) Quotes’ (Figure 1) contained only negative 
opinions of the protest which was clearly unrepresent-
ative of the spread of local opinion. 
The notion that individuals from outside of the ‘lo-
cality’ were illegitimate protesters was also a recur-
ring theme in GMP statements. This appeared to rest 
on the assumption that fracking at Barton Moss was 
solely an issue for people living within Greater Man-
chester. Given the far-reaching nature of the potential 
environmental impacts of fracking, and the contribu-
tion of unconventional fossil fuels to global climate 
change, as well as the significance of Barton Moss in 
the advancement of fracking policy at the national 
level in the UK, defining fracking as a ‘local’ issue in 
these terms is problematic. It appears instead that the 
idea of a distinction between the Camp and the local 
community was reproduced to shape the public per-
ception of the protest. 
A further illustrative example of GMP’s apparent at-
tempts to influence the representation of protesters 
at Barton Moss, came in another section of the pres-
entation to the Independent Advisory Panel on the 
Policing of Protests given by Chief Superintendent 
Roberts on 10th March 2014. This presentation con-
tained images of protesters, apparently from Barton 
Moss, which are contrasted with images of police of-
ficers and these images are reproduced below (Figures 
2 & 3). All of the images selected of protesters pre-
sented them with their faces covered and as a result 
made them appear intimidating, in stark contrast to 
the images used of Protest Liaison Officers. The im-
ages reinforce the representation of protesters as out-
siders who were seeking to intimidate the community. 
Furthermore, in portraying all protesters as masked, 
the presentation to the Independent Advisory Panel 
suggested that this was common practice, and in-
ferred that it was done out of necessity to conceal the 
identity of those involved at the Camp. These images 
were wholly unrepresentative of the practices of Camp 
residents and visitors as shown in numerous pictures 
shared online and through a range of social and main-
stream media sources.
The police commentary provided through a series of 
public statements contributed to the dominant rep-
resentation of the protest. The police narrative drew 
from, and contributed to, public debates on both 
fracking and on the right to protest. It reproduced and 
reinforced the image of protesters as unreasonable in 
both their demands and their behaviour. Portraying 
protesters as unrepresentative of the local community, 
in both their origins, and their motivations, appeared 
to be part of an attempt to deny legitimacy to the pro-
test. 
Figure 1,  Slide 
Barton Moss 
Briefing’ pres-
entation given 
by Chief Su-
perintendent 
Roberts to the 
Independent 
Advisory Panel 
on Policing 
of Protests 
(Greater Man-
chester Police, 
Freedome 
of Informa-
tion Request 
Reference No: 
1331/15, 7 July 
2015.)
25
KEEP MOVING!
Figure 2,  ‘Protesters’. Slide taken from the ‘Barton Moss Briefing’ presentation given by 
Chief Superintendent Roberts to the Independent Advisory Panel on the Policing of Pro-
tests (Greater Manchester Police, Freedom of Information Request Reference No: 1331/15, 
7 July 2015.) 
Figure 3, ‘Role of the Police Liaison Officer’. Slide taken from the ‘Barton Moss Briefing’ 
presentation given by Chief Superintendent Roberts to the Independent Advisory Panel 
on the Policing of Protests (Greater Manchester Police, Freedom of Information Request 
Reference No: 1331/15, 7 July 2015.)
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The statements of Chief Superintendent Roberts, 
in particular, seemed to reinforce the dominant im-
age of certain anti-fracking protesters as irrational in 
their opposition to both fracking and the policing of 
protest, an idea promoted in early 2014 by the Prime 
Minister82.  The dominant concern of police spokes-
people appeared to be justifying the policing opera-
tion, including the use of force, rather than providing 
effective communication with the protesters or the 
public. Despite GMPs reassurances of their desire to 
uphold the right to protest, the communication strat-
egy, including the attempt to reproduce crude stereo-
types about protesters, as well as the behaviour of of-
ficers at Barton Moss, undermined this claim. 
4.4 police violence anD haRassMent 
Police violence at protests is becoming a growing con-
cern among protesters from a range of campaigns and 
movements, and has been highlighted by observers 
of trends in public order policing83.  Many protesters 
interviewed for this report cited the policing at Bar-
ton Moss as the most brutal that they had witnessed. 
Antagonistic methods of harassment were outlined by 
many of the protesters: 
‘I tried to raise it with the Chief Inspector this morn-
ing…I’m walking along at what I am agreeing is a 
reasonable pace, I’m being compliant with them, 
and they are agreeing it’s a reasonable pace, and yet 
repeatedly, about once a second, they shouted very 
loudly in each of my ears, ‘keep moving, please keep 
moving’. I’m trying to square that with our peaceful 
protest because over a 45 minute period, that’s quite a 
harassment. And so I ask them to say it a little more 
quietly and, of course, they say it louder next time. 
That’s important, even at that base level. They are de-
termined no peaceful protest is going to happen’.
The twice daily protests, for at least four days a week, 
of walking the trucks into and off the site over a five 
month period were unprecedented for those taking 
part. The intensity of this unrelenting form of protest 
was exacerbated by the inconsistency of how these 
marches would play out on a daily basis. 
The running battle between the protesters and the po-
lice revolved around the length of time taken to travel 
the 800 metre stretch of road; this could take as little 
as 15 minutes or up to several hours and this added to 
the uncertainty of taking part:
 
‘one day we could actually just peace-
fully and calmly be walking down the 
road and be allowed to walk down the 
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‘Each time on the line I have to say – because I’ve 
only been one place and that’s on the line – each time 
I’ve experienced a fist in my kidneys, not necessarily 
a punching fist, but certainly fists and twisting them 
into your kidneys and stuff, and the walking on the 
back of your heels. That’s the favourite one, lifting 
these big boots up on the toes and stepping on the back 
of your heel so you start to stagger and fall forward 
and then they can push you a bit more and threaten 
you with pushing back on them’ 
This violence appeared to escalate significantly when 
TAU officers were deployed to cover the marches. As 
the protest went on, these officers were involved on 
a daily basis. The excessive use of force displayed by 
TAU officers at Barton Moss typified the protest for 
many of those involved:
 
‘there’s a massive, massive difference 
between the two styles of policing… a 
gradual, general escalation in violence 
in tau deployment’ - protester
Those interviewed for the purpose of this report de-
scribed the tactic of mass arrest as having a particu-
larly brutalising and destabilising effect on camp resi-
dents. Protesters recalled that decisions about who to 
arrest, and who to remove from the protest, appeared 
to be pre-planned and pre-emptive, rather than a 
genuine response to law breaking or disorder at the 
site. In keeping with this objective, targeted arrests ap-
peared to be initially focussed on those members of 
the camp who were perceived by police not to be lo-
cal. Protesters understood this action to be part of the 
narrative GMP wished to construct about the lack of 
local involvement in the camp:
‘it’s definitely intimidation and it’s 
to scare people off, basically to the 
point that they’re too scared or hurt 
to come back, to deter people, to get 
us to lose support, to scare away the 
road, and other times we’ll just be 
shoved, pushed and beaten, and we 
just never know what kind of day it’s 
going to be’ - protester
This unpredictability, and the ever looming threat of 
violence, functioned to aggravate and unsettle pro-
testers and does not appear to have been driven by a 
response to maintain public safety or public order. For 
some, over a sustained period of the protest, this un-
certainty coupled with several other tactics, including 
a significant police presence from early in the morn-
ing, several hours before IGas lorries would arrive, re-
sulted in psychological and emotional distress. It was 
predominantly during the walk-ins that protesters 
also reported being physically handled by the police. 
They describe, below, the frequent occurrence of be-
ing pushed and shoved, having their heels stood on, 
having knuckles dug into their backs, being grabbed 
around the waist and pushed down the road, and be-
ing verbally harassed: 
‘the knuckles in the back, stepping 
on people’s feet, stepping on people’s 
heels; it’s quite deliberate. i’ve told 
them many times that it’s a peaceful 
protest and there is no need for it, but 
they just carry on doing it – telling me 
to march faster. i’m clearly moving, 
i’m clearly within my normal right to 
keep moving, and they just keep as-
saulting me and assaulting other peo-
ple’ - protester
This type of experience was recounted on numerous 
occasions by protesters:
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locals. they’re not afraid to do what 
they do in front of cameras. it’s almost 
like they want the world to see what 
they’re doing, to send a message, you 
know, “stay away or this will be you.”’  
- protester
Those who were constructed as useful to the camp and 
protest also appeared to be targeted. This category of 
protester included both those who were perceived to 
be experienced protesters and/or particularly influen-
tial on camp and those new to protest, as well as those 
who were seen to have a specific role such as filming 
the marches for live streaming:
‘People have been targeted for arrest because they are 
new on camp, the police haven’t seen them before, 
and the police want to find out who they are. And, 
also, if you’ve never been arrested before, it unnerves 
you, so you might not come back. Also, people have 
been targeted because of things they’ve done on other 
campaigns’.
Protesters also described the provocative targeting of 
some of the camp’s more ‘vulnerable’ members, in-
cluding young, elderly and disabled protesters, and 
women:
‘It seems to stem from a more systemic tactical ap-
proach. Since being here I’ve watched them systemi-
cally target elderly people, women, the very young … 
And I believe that’s been a tactic that the police have 
adopted specifically to try and get a violent reaction 
from the protesters here’.
The PCC Independent Panel report arrived at an em-
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phatic decision that no police violence or brutality 
could be substantiated. They managed to do this with-
out adequately considering the fairness or propor-
tionality of the policing operation. There was no dis-
cussion, in the report or elsewhere, of the suitability 
or necessity of TAU deployment, nor of their role once 
deployed or their conduct during the policing opera-
tion. The facilitation of a peaceful protest was not aid-
ed by the use of TAU officers. The decision to deploy 
TAU officers so frequently seems incompatible with 
the size and nature of the protest and to the likelihood 
of serious disorder. The policing strategy appeared to 
have been adopted to maintain a hostile environment 
and to break the will and spirit of the camp, and it was 
arguably this strategy, defined by what appeared to be 
deliberate provocation and harassment (rather than 
the protesters’ actions), that exacerbated the threat to 
public order.  
4.5 genDeReD violence
Violent police practices also appeared to target wom-
en and girls using a specific form of gendered polic-
ing which utilised the dynamics between male police 
officers and female protesters to threaten and intimi-
date84.  Although the proportionality of these respons-
es is clearly questionable, the issue identified here is 
the sexualised nature of this approach, defined by one 
protester as ‘inappropriate’ behaviour: 
‘a lot of the time it is women on the 
front line, but not only that we’ve no-
ticed officers specifically target wom-
en for violence, they’ve inappropriately 
touched them, groped them. i’ve been 
inappropriately touched. every single 
woman on the front line has had some 
kind of inappropriate physical con-
tact with an officer…sometimes their 
hands will just go up way too high. 
somebody had their breast groped.’  - 
protester 
This overt ‘inappropriate’ behaviour took many forms, 
according to those interviewed, ranging from lan-
guage and harassment that was used to frame intimi-
dating, everyday interactions between male police 
officers and female protesters – ‘They were just being 
really sexist’  – through to physical and sexual threats 
enacted by the bodies of police officers – ‘The officers 
walking in a line, pushing their groins on women’. This 
‘inappropriate’ physical contact left many women pro-
testers feeling frightened, offended and violated:
‘i did have an officer so close behind 
me, his entire body was pressed 
against mine the entire time… and 
because i was walking the slowest, 
he was pressed right into me and just 
walked me the entire road...i did tell 
him all the time i would try to move 
to one side or another side, he just 
stayed exactly almost glued to my 
back, and it felt very, very violating, 
very violating’.  - protester
The invasive nature of this policing appeared to play 
upon the use of, or threat of, sexual violence as a way 
of controlling the behaviour of women and, in this 
context, their involvement in direct action. Here, pro-
testers suggested that women were policed differently 
to men and sexualised violent conduct was used as a 
gendered policing tactic to frighten and intimidate 
women.
Two incidents which gained a high degree of media 
coverage involved the arrests of the same female pro-
tester. Police violence in both of these instances ap-
pears to be substantiated by video footage made avail-
30
KEEP MOVING!
able by protesters online85.  Explicit, aggressive and 
disproportionate force appeared to be used to restrain 
and arrest this protester and the first of these arrests 
was widely cited by many of those involved in the pro-
test as a turning point in the already problematic rela-
tionship between the police and the protesters. As one 
protester notes:
‘i thought they let themselves down. 
i generally had a very good opinion of 
the police, ‘cos they do a lot of good 
work…after the [incident] it was 
quite clear that they wouldn’t have 
minded if she died. i was concerned, i 
witnessed it and she was in a bad way, 
and many people questioned the polic-
ing that day.’ - protester
The interviews with protesters conducted for this 
report illustrated that this case was seen by many to 
characterise both the excessive and gendered nature 
of the policing at Barton Moss, and to highlight the 
apparent levels of impunity afforded to TAU officers. 
The PCC Independent Panel report makes reference 
only to what happened once the arrested protester 
reached the police station after the second arrest, and 
does not comment on either of the arrests themselves, 
despite them both being significant events in the po-
licing operation and the continuing deterioration of 
relations between police and protesters. In leaving an 
assessment of the fairness and proportionality of the 
policing out of its report, the PCC Independent Pan-
el report did not adequatley consider the sustained 
harassment cited by the protesters. The persistent in-
timidation and brutality described by the protesters 
appeared to be aimed at preventing the protest being 
effective rather than responding to breaches of the law. 
4.6 iMpaRtiality
The policing operation was presented by GMP as 
a balancing act with the police finding themselves 
“stuck in the middle”86,  compelled to respect the pro-
testers’ right to protest and IGas’ right to conduct the 
exploratory drilling for which it had been granted a 
licence:
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‘We have to be there to ensure the protest is peace-
ful and to balance the rights of the protesters and 
those wanting to carry out drilling on the site 
which are both lawful activities.’87  
However, the contents of the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (MOU) signed between GMP and IGas, 
raises questions about the independence of GMP 
in their response to the protest at Barton Moss. The 
MOU demonstrates that IGas had insider access to 
Gold and Silver senior police command meetings, 
daily briefings or video conferences with GMP’s Sil-
ver Commander and shared police and local council 
information and intelligence. Furthermore, the MOU 
demonstrates that IGas took a lead in all media com-
munications, “both proactive and reactive”’88  in liai-
son with GMP’s Corporate Communications team. 
This memorandum brings into question the idea that 
the police sought to ‘balance’ the rights of protesters 
and IGas impartially. The MOU followed email cor-
respondence between Chief Superintendent Roberts 
and an IGas representative in which the senior GMP 
officer encouraged the greater involvement of the 
company in the planning of the policing operation: 
‘I think the experience of the last two days has clearly 
demonstrated the need for a dedicated company rep-
resentative in the control room on red days. The rep 
should be able to manage and update on logistical 
movements in real time.’89
No similar invitation was extended to protesters. GMP 
have refused requests under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act  to release full details of the communications 
between themselves and IGas over the course of Op-
eration Geraldton.90
The conduct of GMP officers throughout the course of 
Operation Geraldton raised further concerns among 
journalists, legal observers and protesters about the 
police role. GMP’s professed impartiality was ques-
tioned in light of the conduct of officers and the public 
statements made by official GMP spokespeople that 
sought to underplay the complaints made by those 
involved. Chief Constable Peter Fahy repeatedly sug-
gested that the low number of complaints received by 
GMP was indicative of the nature of the police opera-
tion. However, the records released under the Freedom 
of Information Act contradict these suggestions as the 
numbers were much higher than Fahy suggested, as 
indicated above in section 4.2. Additionally, a signifi-
cant proportion (40%) related to the misuse of force. 
Complaints against GMP officers during Operation 
Geraldton included `aggressive behaviour’, `unneces-
sary force’, `abusive language’, `insulting behaviour’, 
`improper treatment’, and being `denied legal advice’. 
The professed impartiality of GMP was again brought 
into question by comments made by Deputy District 
Judge Saunders at Manchester Magistrates Court on 
3rd July 2014. Acquitting Barton Moss defendants, the 
judge accused Greater Manchester Police of exceed-
ing its powers by intervening on IGas’ behalf during a 
civil trespass and of “acting as civil enforcement offic-
ers” for the company.91
 
For many of those involved at Barton Moss who had 
also been at Balcombe, the two experiences differed 
significantly not just in the duration and frequency 
of protest marches, but in the style and ‘intensity’ of 
the policing. It was also notably different from the en-
counters that some of the more experienced protest-
ers had of direct action at other protests. This appears 
to reflect a growing trend in the targeting of anti-
fracking groups which is being strengthened by the 
increasing collaboration between police and corpora-
tions, as noted by observers of recent developments in 
public order policing.92
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‘The majority of people who are arriving at the site 
are not there to protest against fracking but are there 
to disrupt and intimidate the local community and to 
antagonise police. We have seen offences of assaults, 
damage, harassment of residents and workers, a flare 
fired at the police helicopter and threats to kill.’94
Chief Superintendent Roberts also portrayed officers 
as victims suffering from a sustained campaign of vio-
lence from camp residents: 
‘Officers are verbally abused on a daily basis, one has 
even been spat at and another officer required stitches 
to his hand after trying to get a protester down from 
a fence’ 
cRiMinalising peaceful pRotest: aRRests, 
pRosecutions anD outcoMes
5.1 aRRests
5.1.1 offences
As the policing operation intensified, concerns were 
raised by protesters that much of the media report-
ing of the protest appeared to focus on the protesters’ 
role as the instigators rather than victims of violence. 
Many of these reports reproduced the regular GMP 
press releases which provided a running commentary 
on the number of arrests and cost of the policing op-
eration93.  In a statement published on 23rd January 
2014, Chief Superintendent Roberts described the on-
going protest as an “emerging threat” that was tainted 
by widespread violence and criminality. In doing so 
he sought to impose a meaning on the motivations of 
those who were joining the protest:
Figure 4, Number of arrests by category of offence (Greater Manchester Police, Freedom of Information request ref No: 1261/15, 1 June 2015)
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These statements were supported by repeated refer-
ences to the high volume of arrests under Operation 
Geraldton – a total of 231 by the conclusion of the 
protest.95
Figures obtained by the authors under the Freedom 
of Information Act cast doubt on police portrayals of 
protesters and camp residents as violent96.  These fig-
ures show that arrests were made for one or more of 
nineteen different offences, ranging in severity from 
minor public order offences to Threats to Kill (which 
carries a maximum sentence of ten years imprison-
ment) (See Figure 4 above). The largest category of 
arrests was for Obstruction of a Public Highway (77 
arrests, 33% of total arrests). This was followed by 
Aggravated Trespass (68 arrests, 30% of total arrests) 
and Breach of Conditions of Bail97  (31 arrests, 13% of 
overall arrests). Only 2% of arrests were for offences 
that require violence or threatened violence against 
the person as a constituent element of the offence.98 
In contrast, 83% of arrests were for offences against 
property, violation of land rights and breaching con-
ditions of bail. 
5.1.2 pRofile of aRRestees
As noted in above in section 4.3 of this report, a key 
component of GMP’s narrative concerning the protest 
was that the camp consisted of outside ‘agitators’ who 
did not have the support of the local population.  A 
press release published by GMP on 23rd January 2014 
claimed that the overwhelming majority of those ar-
rested were ‘from outside the Greater Manchester area, 
many from the South of England’, adding that the local 
residents felt ‘intimidated in their own homes from 
people who have travelled from all parts of the coun-
try to set up camp in Barton Moss.’99 Whilst, as noted 
above, the ‘local’ character of the protest is arguably of 
limited significance given the apparent global threats 
from fracking, it is somewhat revealing that GMP’s ac-
count appears to be contradicted by their own figures 
on the issue. Figure 5 is taken from the PowerPoint 
presentation delivered by Chief Superintendent Rob-
erts to the Independent Advisory Panel on 10th March 
2014100.  The slide provides a breakdown of the home 
addresses of 132 arrestees under Operation Gerald-
ton. According to these figures, by far the largest cate-
gory of arrestees (38 in total, 29% of arrestees) resided 
in the Irlam/Eccles/Salford area (i.e. in the direct vi-
cinity of the Barton Moss site). This was followed by 
25 arrests (19%) of individuals with no fixed address, 
14 arrests (11%) of Manchester residents and 5 arrests 
(4%) of people from Wigan. In other words, just un-
der two-thirds (64%, 84 in total) of the 132 arrests in-
cluded on Chief Superintendent Roberts’ list were for 
people who either resided in ‘the Greater Manchester 
area’ or had no fixed address. In contrast, only 23 ar-
rests (17%) were of people whose home address could 
legitimately be described as ‘the South of England’101. 
This compares to 99 (75%) arrestees from North West 
England or with no fixed address. These figures would 
suggest that those arrested under Operation Gerald-
ton were overwhelmingly ‘local’. 
 
5.1.3 pRe-eMptive aRRests
Between 27th November 2013 and 12th February 
2014, the majority of those arrested in connection 
with stopping or slowing the trucks through the daily 
slow marches were arrested on suspicion of Obstruc-
tion of the Highway102.  In what appeared to be a well-
planned manoeuvre by GMP, protesters were issued 
with flyers which informed them that Barton Moss 
Road was a ‘highway’ as it was ‘a public right of way’ 
(Figure 6)103.  Following a ruling by Manchester and 
Salford Magistrates’ Court on 12th February that the 
land in question was a public footpath, rather than a 
public highway, officers began to make large numbers 
of arrests for the alternative offence of Aggravated 
Trespass104.  This shift from one arrest power to an-
other in the absence of a significant change in protest-
ers’ behaviour fuelled speculation that arrest under 
Operation Geraldton was part of a broader mission 
to gather intelligence, control and suppress the protest 
and disrupt and undermine the campaign. 
A document obtained by the authors entitled, ‘Op 
Geraldton: Protest Demonstration, Barton Moss, Ec-
cles’ lends support to the view that GMP were well 
prepared for the protest and were determined to in-
fluence how it would develop (Figure 7)105.  Although 
the specific reasons for the production of this docu-
ment are unclear, it appears to be a briefing document 
for Gold, Silver and Bronze commanders within GMP. 
The document includes advice from an in-house GMP 
lawyer on the potential legal basis for arrests at the 
Barton Moss site. The legislative provisions referred 
to in the document include wilful obstruction of the 
highway under the Highways Act 1980, conditions on 
assemblies under the Public Order Act 1986, aggra-
vated trespass under the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 and ‘watching and besetting’ under 
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Figure 5,  PowerPoint slide detailing home addresses of individuals arrested under Opera-
tion Geraldton (Greater Manchester Police, Freedom of Information Request Reference 
No: 1331/15, 7 July 2015.) 
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the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolida-
tion) Act 1992. It would appear that the ‘Op Gerald-
ton’ document enabled police officers to ‘cherry pick’ 
from a range of arrest powers in order to legitimise an 
operational decision to clear specific protesters from 
the site. As one protester noted:
‘They’re arresting lots of people for aggravated 
trespass, but at the same time if they’re arresting 
one they should arrest everyone ... they specifi-
cally target people, so they actually do have a list 
of people they specifically want.’
5.1.4 police Bail
Allegations of the arbitrary application of arrest pow-
ers are further supported by the way in which arrest-
ees were processed in the police station. Amendments 
to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 under 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 extended police bail 
powers to allow officers to attach conditions of bail 
prior to any decision to prosecute. These highly dis-
cretionary powers require that the officer regards the 
conditions as being ‘necessary’ to ensure, for example, 
that the person in question does not commit an of-
fence while on bail106.  The majority of protesters ar-
rested under Operation Geraldton were released on 
police bail which contained one or more of the follow-
ing conditions (see Figure 8): 
• Not to go onto Barton Moss Road from its junction 
with the A57 Liverpool Road (including the lay-by 
along the A57) to its junction with Twelve Yards Road 
(including the bridge over the M62) and beyond, half 
mile to the railway.
• Not to go onto Twelve Yards Road from its junction 
with Barton Moss Road for half a mile to Black Wood 
and to include the area of Black Wood.
• Not to go into the area marked in RED opposite 
Black Wood.
• Not to enter the area shaded RED by the protesters’ 
camp. 
• Not to enter the area of the A57 shaded in RED on 
the map, including the central reservation and the bus 
lay-by opposite Barton Moss Road. **Travel along the 
A57 through this area is allowed as long as it is in a 
vehicle which must not stop to allow alighting**107.
These highly restrictive conditions amounted to a de 
facto ban on attending protests at Barton Moss. Any-
one returning to the protest, following their release 
from custody would risk further arrest108. Indeed, as 
noted above, 31 arrests (13% of the total number ar-
rests) were for breaching conditions of bail. 
The imposition of blanket bail conditions had little 
regard to the individual circumstances of the arres-
tee or the nature of the alleged offence. For example, 
it should be noted that very few of those arrested for 
obstruction offences were interviewed at the police 
station before being released on police bail, suggest-
ing that there was little or no attempt to consider the 
necessity to impose conditions nor the proportional-
ity of the conditions imposed.  We are also aware of a 
significant disparity between the pre-charge bail con-
ditions imposed by the police and those subsequently 
imposed by the Magistrates’ Court: 
‘But, what struck me immediately was 
when they came to the magistrates’ 
court – they [gMp] were putting bail 
restrictions on – the magistrates’ 
courts were just taking the bail con-
ditions off. so, they were trying to 
exclude people from the protests.’  - 
protester
The decision to continue to impose broad bail condi-
tions, despite the readiness of the Magistrates’ Court 
to vary conditions, raises questions about the extent 
to which the police were aware of the potential inter-
ference with Articles 10 and 11 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (guaranteeing rights to free 
speech and peaceful assembly). The use of police bail 
to restrict legitimate protest led some protesters who 
were taken into custody to refuse bail conditions in 
order to seek advice from solicitors and have the op-
portunity to appear in court. This was a course of ac-
tion that was met with some resistance by the police:
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Figure 6, Flyer issued to camp 
residents, reproduced in ‘Greater 
Manchester Police, Op Geraldton: 
Protest Demonstration, Barton 
Moss, Eccles’ (Greater Manchester 
Police, date unknown)
Figure 7, Extract from ‘Greater 
Manchester Police, Op Geraldton: 
Protest Demonstration, Barton 
Moss, Eccles’ (Greater Manchester 
Police, date unknown)
38
KEEP MOVING!
‘when they give you your bail conditions you’re 
supposed to be able to say, “No,” and then stay in 
overnight and go to court, but they were refus-
ing people to do that … First arrest I kept saying, 
“Can I talk to the solicitors?” and they kept say-
ing, “Yes, we’ll ring later,” and they tried to bail 
me out the station before I talked to them and I 
refused. I said, “No, I want to talk a solicitor be-
fore I leave,” and they were just, like, “Oh, well, 
if they don’t answer now then you’ll have to go.”’ 
The use of blanket bail conditions in this context ena-
bled the police to disrupt the protest without recourse 
to the formal criminal justice system, amounting to 
a form of summary justice. Police officers merely 
require ‘reasonable suspicion’ to make an arrest – a 
much lower threshold than that required to establish 
legal guilt (‘beyond all reasonable doubt’) and Crown 
Prosecution Service decisions to prosecute (‘a realistic 
prospect of conviction’). Whilst an application to the 
Magistrates’ Court can be made to vary pre-charge bail 
conditions109,  it is increasingly difficult to access legal 
aid in order to do so. The (mis)use of strict pre-charge 
bail conditions in this context has been strongly con-
demned by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights 
to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association: 
‘I am also dismayed about very strict police bail 
conditions which have been imposed on protest-
ers who have been arrested, to deter them from 
further exercising their rights. Such conditions 
may be challenged before a court, but the process 
is costly and can be a strain to some, especially 
when legal aid is being cut as part of austerity 
measures.’110
Despite the obvious threat to civil liberties posed by 
the use of indiscriminate bail conditions at Barton 
Moss, no reference was made to police bail in the PCC 
Panel report.
5.2 outcoMes
‘i don’t think in terms of numbers of 
arrested, we’re screening anything 
other than normal attrition rates’
- chief supeRintenDent RoBeRts, gMp, 19th MaRch 2014
Whilst the initial arrests received some media atten-
tion, far less coverage was given to these cases once 
they eventually reached court. Of the 231 arrests, 226 
led to charges relating to 115 individuals111.  Some of 
the first cases to reach court were for Obstruction of 
the Highway. These cases collapsed following a hear-
ing on 12th February 2014 at Manchester and Salford 
Magistrates’ Court, when District Judge Qureshi ruled 
that the land in question was not a public highway112. 
Concurrent charges of obstructing a police officer in 
the course of a lawful duty were later dismissed on the 
grounds that the arrests and the force used to ‘push’ 
protesters down the road, were unlawful113.  When 
concerns about the number of cases that were collaps-
ing before trial were put to GMP, they were dismissed 
as part of the ordinary criminal justice process. In an 
interview published on YouTube on 19th March 2014, 
Chief Superintendent Roberts claimed, ‘I don’t think 
in terms of the numbers arrested, we’re seeing any-
thing other than normal attrition rates’, adding that he 
was ‘very happy’ with how the cases were progress-
a note on the Data
During the course of preparing this report we have 
found it very difficult to access accurate and reli-
able information on the progress of the Barton Moss 
prosecutions. Freedom of Information Act requests 
have been refused by GMP and the CPS on the ba-
sis that a collective list of case outcomes has not 
been collated by either organisation115. In light of 
the ongoing public concerns about the high volume 
of failed prosecutions discussed below116,  these re-
sponses indicate at the very least a remarkable lack of 
assessment and evaluation on the part of GMP and 
the CPS. Moreover, reports that GMP officers have 
been present in court during the criminal hearings 
would appear to suggest that there has been an at-
tempt to keep a record of case outcomes.117 The CPS 
has also stated that the Barton Moss cases are “kept 
under constant review”118.  Interim figures obtained 
from GMP and reportedly verified by the CPS were 
also published by the Manchester Evening News in 
June 2014.119
On the 27th May 2015 we made a request for inter-
nal review of the CPS’ refusal to comply with our 
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Figure 8, Map 
provided to 
bailed protest-
ers by GMP 
detailing condi-
tions of bail 
(source: per-
sonal corresp-
pondence)
information request. After failing to receive a deci-
sion within the statutory 20 working day time limit, 
we contacted the Information Commissioner’s Office 
(ICO) who wrote to the CPS on the 22nd September 
2015 instructing them to conduct an internal review 
within another further 20 working days. The CPS 
again failed to provide an internal review within the 
time frame. Our complaint is now the subject of a for-
mal investigation by the ICO and we await their final 
declaration.120 
The following analysis is based on information that we 
have been able to piece together from a combination 
of Freedom of Information Act requests, media re-
ports, personal correspondence and listings informa-
tion provided by Manchester and Salford Magistrates’ 
Court. For the reasons noted above, we are not able to 
verify the accuracy of the case outcome figures at the 
time of publication of this report. We are also aware 
of 22 Aggravated Trespass cases that are still ongoing, 
nearly two years since the conclusion of the protest. 
Nevertheless, the information available to us on that 
cases that have concluded so far is indicative of a gen-
eral trend in the progress in the Barton Moss prosecu-
tions which warrants further investigation.
ing.114  
Figure 9 illustrates the ‘conviction rate’ – the num-
ber of people convicted relative to the number 
charged with offences – within the criminal justice 
system as a whole and under Operation Geraldton 
up to 12th February 2016. The conviction rate within 
the criminal justice system as a whole is 83%. For 
summary offences (those heard in the Magistrates’ 
Court) the figure is 81%121.  For public order offenc-
es this rises to 96%. At the time of publication of this 
report, the Barton Moss cases have a conviction rate 
of just 29%. That is, of the 93 prosecuted protest-
ers whose cases have concluded, only 33 have been 
convicted of offences. Taking into account those in-
dividuals who had no further action taken against 
them following arrest, two thirds (66%) of protest-
ers whose cases have concluded have been cleared 
of wrongdoing. Some twenty two cases connected 
to protests are ongoing.
In those cases where protesters have challenged 
the evidence against them, conviction rates are 
even lower (Figure 10). Of the 72 concluded cases 
where Not Guilty pleas have been maintained, only 
12 (17%) have been found guilty after trial. The re-
maining 60 protesters (83%) have either had their 
cases discontinued by the CPS before trial (40) or 
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been found Not Guilty by the courts (20). In other 
words, 79% of arrested protesters who challenged the 
evidence against them saw their cases dropped, dis-
continued or were found not guilty by the courts. It 
would appear that conviction and attrition rates un-
der Operation Geraldton are far from ‘normal’.
The unsuccessful prosecutions included: 
• A fifteen year old child, arrested on 21st February 
2014 for Aggravated Trespass after she visited the site 
in order to complete a school geography project. The 
schoolgirl was reportedly detained for over 6 hours 
following her arrest before being released from Swin-
ton Police Station. Bail conditions imposed at the po-
lice station prohibited her accessing the Barton Moss 
site and stopping along the A57 road in Salford - the 
road her father lives on. The case was discontinued by 
the CPS on 30th May 2014, three days before she was 
due to stand trial.122
• An adult male arrested on 14th January 2014 for fail-
ure to provide a specimen. A video published on the 
YouTube website shortly after the incident shows an 
officer aggressively pushing the protester down the 
road before accusing him of driving under the influ-
ence.123 The protester can be heard explaining to the 
officer that he had only been drinking a cup of tea. 
The case was withdrawn by the CPS on 28th January 
2014 on the grounds that there was insufficient evi-
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Figure 9:  Comparison of conviction rates: all offences, public order offences, Barton Moss protests (up to 12th February 2016) and 
Balcombe protests
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dence to substantiate the charge. Dubbed the ‘Teagate’ 
incident, the arrest was widely reported in the press 
and on social media. Following an investigation of the 
incident, the Independent Police Complaints Com-
mission recommended in October 2015 that gross 
misconduct proceedings should be brought against 
the officer involved.124
• An adult male arrested in January 2014 for ‘Threats 
to Kill’ following allegations from IGas employees. 
Bail conditions imposed at the police station pro-
hibited access to the Barton Moss site. The protester 
was acquitted on 8th May 2014 after District Judge 
Qureshi ruled that there were “wide inconsistencies” 
in the testimony from IGas witnesses.125  
The Barton Moss cases have followed a similar pattern 
to those arising from the Balcombe protests. Research 
by the Guardian newspaper found that of the 126 ar-
rests made by Sussex Police during days of action out-
side the Cuadrilla site, 114 led to charges relating to 90 
individuals. Only 29 of these resulted in convictions 
– a conviction rate of just 25%126.  
It is notable that a significant number of cases pros-
ecuted under Operation Geraldton were discontin-
ued by the CPS prior to any opportunity to evaluate 
the strength of evidence in an open court. Of the 65 
prosecuted cases that had concluded at the time of 
publication of this report, 28% (18) were discontin-
ued by the CPS before trial. This is well over twice the 
national average of 11%127.  In reality, the number of 
cases in which the CPS offered no evidence at a late 
stage in the proceedings is likely to be higher, given 
that many of the Not Guilty verdicts were triggered by 
a hearing at the request of the defence following a CPS 
decision to discontinue the case. These figures suggest 
a remarkable lack of preparation and adequate case 
evaluation by the CPS. It is particularly concerning 
that many of these cases were withdrawn by the CPS 
days before protesters were due to stand trial, hav-
ing already endured a wait of up to two years which, 
in some cases, impacted on their physical and men-
tal health, financial stability and relationships with 
friends and family. The number of cases withdrawn 
by the CPS due to lack of evidence would also appear 
to be at odds with the scale and intensity of the police 
intelligence gathering operation at Barton Moss. As 
Chief Superintendent Roberts noted in his YouTube 
interview, (responding in this instance to allegations 
of police violence): ‘Surely if there were those out-
rageous types of acts we’ve been accused of, then it 
would be on film’.128 At a time of increased financial 
pressure on the criminal justice system, the substan-
tial cost to the public purse arising from these failed 
prosecutions is a matter of public concern that war-
rants further investigation.
Arrested 120
No Further Action 5
Charged 115
Discontinued by CPS 40
Found Not Guilty 20
Convicted (Guilt Plea) 21
Convicted (Not Guilty Plea) 12
Cases Ongoing 22
Figure 10:  Outcome of arrests under Operation Geraldton up to 
12th February 2016
Given the low conviction rates, arrest under Opera-
tion Geraldton did not appear to have been carried 
out with a view to securing convictions. Rather, mass 
arrest and blanket bail served to create a de facto 
protest exclusion zone around the fracking site – an 
action that would otherwise have no basis in law as 
well as being a clear violation of the protesters’ right 
to freedom of assembly under Article 11 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights. Following an 
often violent arrest, as described in section 4.4 above, 
those pursued under Operation Geraldton were pho-
tographed, fingerprinted, had their DNA taken, were 
held in police cells (in some cases overnight) and sub-
ject to bail conditions which severely restricted their 
freedom of assembly. The dubious legality under which 
arrests were carried out, evidenced by the readiness of 
the courts to challenge their legal basis, raises impor-
tant questions about the extent to which the policing 
operation was driven by interests other than public 
order and crime prevention. It is clear from the above 
analysis that mass arrest was a central component of 
Operation Geraldton. The tactic served to physically 
clear protesters from the site, to deter others from at-
tending the camp and to reinforce the construction of 
protesters as violent criminals and thereby legitimise 
the intensity of the policing operation. Whilst there 
have been a small number of convictions arising from 
Operation Geraldton, a closer examination of these 
cases does not appear to lend support to GMP’s char-
acterisation of protesters as violent nor legitimise the 
type of policing response that we observed at Barton 
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Moss. These cases include:
• Three protesters convicted of obstructing an officer 
following their involvement in a peaceful ‘picnic lock-
on’ during a visit to the camp by Green Party leader, 
Natalie Bennett on 6th February 2014. All three re-
ceived absolute discharges129 on 23rd September 2014 
by District Judge Clark at Manchester and Salford 
Magistrates’ Court, with no order for costs or fines.130
• A protester associated with the Barton Moss protest 
convicted of criminal damage after supergluing him-
self to the windows of a Salford City Council build-
ing. Following a guilty plea the protester was fined 
£10, reduced from £150, after the defence successfully 
argued that police officers caused the majority of the 
damage.131
“Throughout the evidence-gathering process of this 
report, no panel members witnessed any behaviour 
by police that could objectively be described as “bru-
tality”. Significantly, none of those we spoke to wit-
nessed behaviour by police that could be categorised 
as violent. No protester we spoke to witnessed police 
violence, no panel member witnessed police violence, 
nor did anyone else we spoke to including impartial 
media representatives who were present at Barton 
Moss … Claims of police violence have not been sub-
stantiated (PCC Panel Report)”’132
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Despite the PCC Panel’s insistence that the policing 
operation was proportionate and balanced, the expe-
riences of the protesters, and those who frequented 
the camp, would suggest that police violence and in-
timidation was a central feature of the policing op-
eration. Protesters described the cumulative effects of 
being involved in the protest. The use of violent ar-
rest, restrictive bail conditions and the daily presence 
of police officers, including the almost constant pres-
ence of PLOs, and the violent presence of the TAU at 
the camp, resulted in a combination of physical, emo-
tional and psychological harm. The PCC Panel report 
denies these experiences and states categorically that 
no allegations of police violence or brutality can be 
substantiated.133 This stance fails to take into account 
widely publicised reports and video evidence of dis-
proportionate and heavy-handed policing, as well as 
the voices of the protesters themselves134,  which serve 
to undermine the PCC Panel report and GMP’s as-
sertion that the policing at Barton Moss was propor-
tionate and responsive135.  The number of protesters 
who were present daily, and their peaceful nature, is at 
odds with the sheer number of police officers assigned 
to Barton Moss136  and this reflects a growing trend 
of ‘overbearing and unnecessary police presence’137  at 
sites of protest where direct action is expected. 
In light of the remarkably low conviction rates, polic-
ing at Barton Moss does not appear to have been con-
cerned with public safety or crime prevention. Instead 
the main police concern appears to have been a desire, 
via whatever means were at their disposal, to gather 
intelligence, intimidate those involved in direct action 
and those at the fringes of the movement, to shape 
the political and media narrative of the protest, and, 
ultimately, to limit the protest and delegitimise dis-
sent. The use of sustained violent tactics had a series 
of brutalising effects on Camp members and visitors, 
and directly undermined the idea that GMP sought 
to balance protesters’ rights with those of the ‘wider 
community’.
The protest at Barton Moss was underpinned by a dis-
proportionate policing operation by GMP – repeat-
edly violent and aggressive, and incompatible with 
the size and nature of the protest. Our analysis would 
suggest that the violation of protesters’ rights was not 
limited to the Barton Moss site. The humiliating ex-
conclusion: infRinging on the Right to pRotest
periences of arrest, detention, restrictions on move-
ment and lengthy criminal proceedings will have a 
lasting impact on those involved. Whilst the protest 
concluded in April 2014, for many this is an enduring 
ordeal – at the time of publication of this report, some 
22 criminal cases are yet to conclude and we are aware 
of several ongoing criminal appeals and civil actions 
against the police.
Throughout the course of this research, we have found 
evidence of a carefully planned policing operation in 
which commercial interests were prioritised over the 
human rights of citizens attempting to exercise their 
democratic right to protest. It is important to note, 
however, that while many protesters reported the 
negative impact that the style of policing had had on 
the camp, for a number of camp residents and visitors 
the experience of policing galvanised the campaign in 
some respects, and brought some people both to the 
Camp and to the issue of fracking: 
‘It’s a combination primarily, of course, anti-
fracking, because that’s the main reason we’re 
here, but the police brutality has attracted actu-
ally even more support from people who may not 
have really bothered about fracking. But from see-
ing the footage and the pictures and the articles of 
how the police are treating us, they’ve become an-
gry, they’ve felt outrage. And they’ve come here, 
and they’ve got involved, and also found out more 
about fracking and, you know, are now part of our 
support network. So it is a combination of both’.
Finally, we found that the harmful effect of the crimi-
nalisation process was mediated by three factors. The 
first was the involvement of a criminal defence team 
which acted for the vast majority of those arrested 
under Operation Geraldton. Led by Simon Pook at 
Robert Lizar Solicitors in Manchester, the legal team 
have devoted many hours pro bono to the cases, 
which has included viewing film and photographic 
evidence, taking witness testimony and engaging in 
legal research. Given the limited availability of legal 
aid funding, and the legal and evidential complexity 
of the cases, it is doubtful that an adequate defence 
could have been mounted without lawyers being 
prepared to work for free. The second factor was the 
collective action of the protesters themselves. The de-
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fence campaign ‘Justice4Barton Moss’ was launched at 
a meeting hosted by the Northern Police Monitoring 
Project138  in February 2014. Together with the human 
rights group Green and Black Cross139,  the campaign 
played a vital role in monitoring the policing opera-
tion, gathering statements, identifying witnesses and 
providing information to protesters at the site and via 
social media. Finally, the coverage of a not-for-profit 
local community publication, the Salford Star, provid-
ed a powerful challenge to the official police account 
of the protest that was largely reproduced in the main-
stream media. Journalists for the Salford Star regular-
ly visited the site and published a series of articles on 
the policing operation and subsequent prosecutions 
that were grounded in the experiences of the protest-
ers. In the absence of a fully independent system of 
police complaints, police monitoring groups, defence 
campaigns and independent community media will 
continue to play a central role in holding police offic-
ers to account.140 
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RecoMMenDations
1
We conclude this report with six key recom-
mendations. The first two recommendations 
relate directly to the Barton Moss protest. Our 
findings also raise a number of issues which 
go beyond the specifics at Barton Moss and 
the final four recommendations apply to this 
broader context. 
This report has highlighted a number of concerns 
about the proportionality of the policing operation at 
Barton Moss and subsequent criminal proceedings. 
Given the centrality of the right to protest in a liberal 
democracy, and that fracking and public opposition 
to fracking continues to be a live issue in the UK, it is 
in the public interest that these issues are investigated 
thoroughly and transparently. To this end we call for 
a fully independent public inquiry into the polic-
ing of the Barton Moss protests. This inquiry should 
consider, among other things: (i) the relationship 
between GMP and IGas; (ii) the proportionality of 
policing tactics at the Barton Moss site; (iii) the accu-
racy of information conveyed to the public by GMP 
during the course of the policing operation; (iv) the 
use of police bail to restrict the right to protest; (v) 
the circumstances surrounding the high number of 
failed prosecutions; and (vi) the total amount of pub-
lic expenditure arising from the policing operation 
and subsequent prosecutions.
puBlic inQuiRy
2
During the production of this report, we have ex-
perienced a remarkable lack of transparency from 
the authorities on specific details of the Barton Moss 
policing operation. For example, we have been faced 
with conflicting statistics from GMP on the num-
tRanspaRency
bers of complaints against the police arising from 
the protests. We have also faced a wall of silence 
from the CPS on the progress of the Barton Moss 
prosecutions. Access to information is vital for any 
well-functioning democracy. Transparency in public 
institutions ensures that they are accountable to the 
citizens they are entrusted to serve. We urge GMP 
and the CPS to publish full details of arrests, charges 
and outcomes arising from the Barton Moss protest 
as a matter of some urgency.
3
We echo the concerns of the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful As-
sembly and of Association on the use of “very strict 
police bail conditions which have been imposed on 
detained protesters with a view to deterring them 
from further exercising their rights”141.  We support 
Netpol’s call for the routine collection of pre-charge 
bail statistics and a complete withdrawal of the use of 
pre-charge conditions for protest-related offences.142
police Bail
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4
We are concerned that the drastic cuts to legal aid 
are severely undermining the right to protest in 
England and Wales. In particular, it has become 
increasingly difficult to access legal aid in the 
context of civil actions against the police which in 
some cases has denied protesters the opportunity 
to hold police officers to account for their unlawful 
behaviour. Restrictions on accessing legal advice and 
representation for non-imprisonable offences such as 
obstruction of the highway, have made it increasingly 
difficult to prevent miscarriages of justice in the 
context of public protest. We therefore support 
calls by the Justice Alliance143  for the Government 
to abandon the restructuring of criminal defence 
and restore legal help to the many currently without 
redress.
legal aiD funDing
 
5
The introduction into domestic law of positive rights 
to free speech and peaceful assembly under the Hu-
man Rights Act 1998 represented a step forward in 
the recognition of a right to protest in England and 
Wales. These rights were central to the legal and 
political campaigns arising from the Barton Moss 
protests. Government proposals to repeal the Human 
Rights Act 1998 are part of a worrying trend towards 
the erosion of rights to free expression and assembly. 
We support calls made by Liberty144  and others to 
defend the Human Rights Act and improve access to 
justice for those seeking to rely upon it.
huMan Rights act 1998
6
All protesters consulted for this research had direct 
experience of police violence exercised in the 
policing of daily slow marches. Yet very few made 
formal complaints to the police or the IPCC. This 
response would appear to reflect the broader erosion 
in the public’s trust and confidence in the police 
complaints system. Our findings highlight the urgent 
need for a fully independent, properly resourced 
system of police complaints in order to maintain 
public confidence and prevent police misconduct.
inDepenDent coMplaints 
systeM
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appenDiX 1 – MethoDology
The data collected for this research has come from a num-
ber of sources, including interviews with protestors; Free-
dom of Information Act requests; public statements; press 
releases; and social and other media sources. All three 
authors were involved in data collection and data analysis. 
Additionally, two research assistants developed a timeline 
of the policing of the protest at the Barton Moss site, using 
publicly available information, such as local and national 
news sources and social media.
The authors of this report made a series of visits to the 
Barton Moss Community Protection Camp to engage in 
fieldwork and undertake semi-structured interviews with 
camp residents and those taking part in direct action. One 
or more of the three authors visited the camp to conduct 
interviews or observations on 15 separate occasions. All of 
the interviews took place on site. As the primary objective 
of the research is to uncover the experiences of policing 
at Barton Moss from the perspectives of the protestors, 
qualitative semi-structured interviews were the preferred 
method. This method has the ability to centralise and pro-
ject unrecognised voices and facilitates a view from below. 
Semi-structured interviews enabled extended discussion 
and allowed for a combination of structure and flexibil-
ity.145
In total 13 interviews were conducted, four of which were 
group interviews (2 x two people; and 2 x three people) 
resulting in 17 participants. Each interview lasted a mini-
mum of 30 minutes, though some were much longer, and 
14 hours of interviews were obtained. These interviews 
provide in-depth, first-person accounts of people’s experi-
ences of the protest at Barton Moss and their perspectives 
on the policing of the protest. As such, they centralise the 
role that experience should play in research146. Purposive 
sampling was undertaken; the authors approached mem-
bers of the camp directly to seek participation after initial 
discussions with gatekeepers from the Justice4Barton 
Moss campaign. 11 men and 6 women were interviewed. 
The age of participants ranged from 19 to 48. All inter-
views were recorded, transcribed and stored securely. 
An interpretive approach to data analysis was adopted 
and this approach sought to illuminate meaning, insight 
and understandings from the interview transcripts.147 A 
process of qualitative coding took place in order to iden-
tify significant and consistent themes. These themes were 
used to establish relationships within and across the data, 
and some have subsequently shaped the various sections 
presented within this report. This inductive approach to 
data analysis allowed the textual data to speak for itself, 
locating the key findings in the narrative of the partici-
pants and grounding the recommendations and conclu-
sions in the knowledge generated from the data. This 
thematic approach was undertaken by all three authors 
ensuring that the reliability and validity of findings was 
maximised. The interview transcripts will be subject to 
further analysis for the purpose of publishing the findings, 
in anonymised format, in scholarly journals. 
As part of the research methodology Freedom of Informa-
tion Act requests were sent to Greater Manchester Police, 
the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for 
Greater Manchester, the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission, the Crown Prosecution Service and the 
Ministry of Justice. The authors made ten applications,148 
which made the following requests for information:
• Total costs of the policing operation at Barton Moss
• How many, and what types of, complaints have been 
made to Greater Manchester Police about the policing 
of Barton Moss? What were the outcomes of these com-
plaints?
• How many protesters/ observers have been arrested at 
the Barton Moss anti-fracking protests? What were the 
grounds for these arrests?
• How many protesters/ observers were charged with of-
fences? 
• How many protesters / observers were convicted of of-
fences?
•What were the bail conditions imposed on arrestees?
• A copy of a presentation by Chief Superintendent Mark 
Roberts
We utilised a further four Freedom of Information Act 
responses, all of which were publicly available. 
The data drawn from the interviews and the Freedom 
of Information Act requests was triangulated with other 
publicly available information, including Greater Man-
chester Police press statements and the Police and Crime 
Commissioner’s Independent Panel Report, in order to 
ensure a rich and detailed analysis and to produce bal-
anced and accurate findings.
The research was undertaken in accordance with Liver-
pool John Moores University and the University of York 
ethical regulations and the principles of ethical research 
as set out by the British Society of Criminology.149 All par-
ticipants were fully aware of the nature and objectives of 
the research and gave their full informed consent prior to 
any interviews taking place. The participants were assured 
that this research was confidential and that tape record-
ings and transcripts were only available to those working 
on the project. Anonymity was assured at all times and 
the participants were free to withdraw from the research 
at any point up until publication of the findings.
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